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Abstract	
	 Healthcare	reform	was	a	significant	political	issue	during	the	November	2016	US	general	
elections,	and	played	an	important	role	in	campaigning	and	political	discourse	leading	to	the	
election.	Donald	Trump,	the	Republican	presidential	candidate,	and	Republicans	running	for	
congressional	office,	campaigned	on	a	platform	advocating	for	the	repeal	and	replacement	of	
the	Patient	Protection	and	Affordable	Care	Act	of	2010	(ACA),	among	other	changes.	Hillary	
Clinton,	the	Democratic	presidential	candidate,	and	Democrats	running	for	congressional	office,	
campaigned	on	a	platform	that	included	support	for	the	ACA,	as	well	as	increased	regulations	
on	the	pharmaceutical	industry	and	health	insurers,	among	various	other	policies.	Republicans	
achieved	unexpectedly	large	electoral	victories.	In	order	to	determine	the	impact	of	the	
election	results	on	the	financial	health	of	key	firms	operating	in	health	care	industries,	event	
study	techniques	and	multivariate	regressions	are	used	to	calculate	and	analyze	cumulative	
abnormal	returns	(CARS)	surrounding	different	event	windows	surrounding	the	election	for	the	
various	relevant	firms	(N=402).	Abnormal	returns	are	also	calculated	by	industry,	including	
pharmaceutical	companies,	health	insurers,	health	care	providers,	and	medical	device	
manufacturers.	Statistically	and	economically	significant	CARs	are	observed	for	the	entire	
sample,	as	well	as	for	drug	companies,	health	insurers,	and	health	care	providers	in	the	short	
term.	Firms	in	the	pharmaceutical	industry,	who	faced	more	stringent	regulation	under	a	
Clinton	administration,	were	affected	the	most	by	the	election	results	and	generated	the	
largest	positive	abnormal	returns	in	every	event	window	considered.	
	
	
	 	
Introduction	
	
Political	Background	
	 Healthcare	system	reform	was	one	of	the	most	controversial	political	issues	of	the	first	
decade	of	the	twenty-first	century	in	American	politics,	as	healthcare	reform	became	a	
consistent	subject	of	research	and	legislative	debate.	Ballooning	healthcare	costs	both	in	terms	
of	dollars	spent	and	as	a	portion	of	GDP,1	ethical	concerns	surrounding	the	difficulty	of	those	
with	pre-existing	conditions	to	obtain	health	insurance,2	and	the	difficulties	facing	millions	of	
other	uninsured	Americans	facing	difficulties	obtaining	insurance3	inspired	a	push	that	resulted	
in	dramatic	legislation.	Despite	significant	opposition,4	the	Patient	Protection	and	Affordable	
Care	Act,	colloquially	referred	to	as	the	Affordable	Care	Act	or	Obamacare	(ACA),	was	signed	
into	law	in	March	2010.5	
	 Passage	of	the	ACA	did	not	eliminate	the	vocal	opposition	to	the	policies	it	enacted.	
Republicans	in	Congress	voted	to	repeal	or	undermine	the	ACA	56	times	between	its	enactment	
and	the	beginning	of	the	2016	election	cycle	in	2015.6	The	political	climate	leading	up	to	the	
November	2016	general	elections	was	marked	by	vitriolic	partisan	conflict.	Virtually	all	
Republican	candidates	for	the	presidency	promised	to	“repeal	and	replace”	the	ACA,	along	with	
the	vast	majority	of	Republican	candidates	for	Congress.7	Donald	Trump,	the	presidential	
candidate	who	ultimately	achieved	an	upset	electoral	victory,	claimed	one	week	before	his	
election	that,	if	elected,	he	would	immediately	hold	a	“special	session”	to	repeal	and	replace	
Obamacare.8	The	platform	published	by	the	Republican	Party	asserted	that	“Any	honest	agenda	
for	improving	healthcare	must	start	with	repeal	of	the	dishonestly	named	Affordable	Care	
Act.”9	Thus,	in	the	time	period	surrounding	the	2016	election,	Republican	electoral	victories	
could	be	perceived	as	a	referendum	on	the	ACA	and	a	potential	first	step	to	its	eventual	repeal.	
The	objective	of	this	study	is	to	determine	the	effect	of	the	surprise	2016	election	results	
influenced	the	stock	prices	of	certain	health	care	companies.	
	 Democratic	candidates	participating	in	the	2016	elections	proposed	a	fundamentally	
different	platform	in	terms	of	health	care.	Unsurprisingly,	the	Democratic	Party	supported	the	
continued	existence	of	the	ACA,	which	was	passed	under	a	Democratic	administration.10	Hillary	
Clinton,	the	democratic	candidate,	actively	supported	the	ACA,	and		generally	advocated	for	
expansions	of	coverage	and	ACA-participation-related	tax	credits.11	She	also	accused	
pharmaceutical	manufacturers	of	price	gouging	and	consistently	supported	dramatic	increases	
on	regulations	for	pharmaceutical	companies,	including	demanding	higher	rebates	for	
prescription	drugs	through	Medicare,	allowing	Medicare	to	negotiate	drug	prices,	increased	
allowances	for	imported	pharmaceuticals,	prohibit	“pay	for	delay”	arrangements	that	allowed	
drug	companies	to	delay	the	entrance	of	generic	drugs	into	the	market,	and	increased	
regulations	for	pharmaceutical	advertising	and	profits	of	drug	companies	that	receive	
government	funding.12	In	the	months	preceding	the	election,	when	a	Clinton	victory	seemed	
probable,	observers	noted	drops	in	pharmaceutical	stock	prices	if	Clinton	so	much	as	tweeted	
about	pharmaceuticals.13	
	 The	2010	legislation	was	of	intense	interest	to	the	industries	involved	with	supporting	or	
providing	health	care.	This	was	evidenced	by	companies	such	as	health	insurers	and	
pharmaceutical	companies14	spending	record	amounts	in	lobbying	efforts	during	the	formation	
process	of	the	ACA,15	with	the	healthcare	industry	spending	more	on	lobbying	endeavors	than	
any	other	sector	of	the	economy	in	the	three	years	leading	to	the	passage	of	the	ACA.16	These	
firms	also	exhibited	unusual	behavior,	such	as	providing	more	funding	to	Democratic	politicians	
than	Republican	ones	for	the	first	time	since	the	last	time	a	Democratic-controlled	government	
was	planning	healthcare	reform	under	the	Clinton	administration.17	The	health	and	success	of	
these	industries	is	essential	for	long-term	improvements	in	the	quality	and	quantity	of	the	
supply	of	health	care	in	the	United	States,	and	the	results	of	the	2016	election	cast	considerable	
doubt	on	the	continued	existence	of	the	most	significant	regulations,	including	but	not	limited	
to	the	ACA,	that	govern	the	environment	in	which	they	operate.	Given	this,	it	is	worthwhile	to	
consider	the	impact	of	the	2016	elections	on	the	financial	performance	of	companies	in	the	
healthcare	industry.		
	 Several	researchers	have	used	event	study	techniques	have	been	used	to	evaluate	the	
impact	of	the	implementation	of	the	ACA,	with	mixed	findings	surrounding	the	impact	of	the	
ACA	on	healthcare	financial	performance.18	This	report	models	the	event	study	analysis	
conducted	by	Blau	et.	al	(2016).	They	evaluated	both	the	impact	the	signing	of	the	Affordable	
Care	Act	into	law,	and	its	validation	in	the	Supreme	Court,	had	on	the	financial	performance	of	
health	care	companies.	They	observed	general	decreased	stock	price	reactions	to	its	passage,	
particularly	amongst	insurers.19	After	a	brief	consideration	of	how	ACA	policies	impact	
healthcare	industries,	this	report	will	use	event	study	techniques	to	evaluate	the	impact	of	the	
2016	elections	on	the	financial	performance	of	the	healthcare	industry.	Examining	abnormal	
returns	of	various	healthcare	stocks	surrounding	the	electoral	success	of	the	Republican	party	
and	Donald	Trump	will	provide	insight	in	the	market’s	opinion	of	the	policies	almost	seven	
years	following	their	implementation.	
Brief	Summary	of	Policy	Implications	of	the	ACA	on	Healthcare	Industries	
	 Because	the	incoming	administration	and	legislators	elected	by	the	2016	would	have	a	
large	impact	on	the	continued	implementation	of	the	ACA,	a	very	brief	overview	of	the	
implications	of	the	ACA	on	the	health	care	industries	studied	is	relevant	here.	The	ACA	was	a	
complex	piece	of	legislation	with	broad	goals.	Some	of	the	changes	broadly	affected	all	
participants	in	the	healthcare	industry.	One	of	the	most	pronounced	effects	of	the	ACA	on	the	
healthcare	industry	was	the	introduction	of	uncertainty	for	companies	with	no	experience	in	
the	new	market	conditions.20	The	ACA	placed	excise	taxes	on	health	insurers	and	
pharmaceutical	companies.21	Research	has	also	implied	that	some	of	the	costs	of	the	changes	
of	the	ACA	were	offset	by	government	transfer	payments	in	the	form	of	subsidies,	and	benefits	
of	increased	volume	of	customers	resulting	from	the	legislation.22	The	Affordable	Care	Act	has	
also	fueled	market	concentration	in	health	care	industries,23	with	mergers	of	health	plans,	
hospitals,	and	medical	groups.	This	may	account	for	the	fact	that	although	using	the	same	data	
collection	methodology,	the	sample	size	is	ten	percent	smaller	relative	to	the	sample	used	by	
Blau	et.	al.	
	 Some	policies	specifically	impact	health	insurers:	In	order	to	address	high	rates	of	
Americans	without	insurance,	the	ACA	implemented	an	“individual	mandate”	requiring	
individuals	and	small	businesses	to	obtain	insurance	or	face	punitive	fines.24	In	order	to	
facilitate	the	transition,	the	ACA	also	mandated	the	creation	of	marketplaces	for	individuals	to	
shop	for	different	government-approved	insurance	plans,	and	increased	subsidies	(in	the	forms	
of	federal	refundable	tax	credits	and	incentives	for	businesses)	available	to	fund	the	plans.25	
While	insurers	benefit	from	additional	Americans	purchasing	insurance,	the	ACA	also	
implemented	policies	that	increased	burdens	on	insurers.	The	ACA	implemented	a	guaranteed	
issue	policy,	which	prohibits	insurers	from	denying	coverage	to	individuals	due	to	any	pre-
existing	conditions,	and	prevents	insurers	from	dropping	individuals	when	they	develop	a	
condition.26	The	ACA	also	increases	regulatory	burdens	in	requiring	the	approval	of	new	plans,	
regulating	risk	management	programs,	regulating	the	use	of	premium	dollars	and	co-payments,	
and	similar	policies.27		
	
Data	Description	
	
Data	
	 Financial	performance	data	used	in	this	analysis	includes	metrics	such	as	closing	daily	
share	prices,	market	capitalization,	volume,	shares	outstanding,	and	bid-ask	spread.	Data	was	
collected	from	the	Center	for	Research	on	Security	Prices	(CRSP).	Firms	were	sampled	based	on	
their	Standardized	Industry	Codes	(SICs)	used	by	CRSP	to	identify	types	of	firms.	The	firms	
sampled	in	this	analysis	were	restricted	to	four	different	subsets:	those	with	SIC	codes	that	
identify	as	pharmaceutical	companies,	health	care	providers,	health	insurers,	or	medical	device	
producers.	This	data	was	used	to	conduct	standard	event	studies	surrounding	the	first	day	of	
market	operation	after	the	2016	general	election	results	were	announced,	November	9th,	2016.	
As	the	results	of	the	election	were	unexpected,	this	day	uniquely	illustrates	how	the	market	
surrounding	the	health	care	industry	responds	to	an	information	shock	unfavorable	to	the	ACA.	
	 Table	5,	in	the	appendix,	lists	the	stock	tickers	of	the	companies	included	in	this	analysis,	
delineated	by	company	type.	The	sample	includes	402	firms	total,	with	59	firms	listed	as	
pharmaceutical	companies	(DRUG),	378	firms	listed	as	health	care	providers	(HEALTHCARE),	14	
firms	listed	as	insurers	(INSURER),	and	51	firms	listed	as	medical	product	manufacturers	
(DEVICE).	Some	firms	fit	into	multiple	categories	and	are	listed	as	such,	so	the	components	do	
not	sum	to	402.	
	 Summary	Statistics	
	 Table	1	reports	statistics	that	describe	the	sample	of	healthcare	related	firms	for	
November	9th,	2016,	the	day	the	information	conveyed	by	the	results	of	the	previous	days’	
election	could	be	internalized	by	the	market.	Price	is	the	closing	price	at	the	end	of	the	day	
according	to	CRSP.	MktCap	is	the	firm’s	market	capitalization.	Turn	is	the	share	turnover	or	the	
daily	volume	scaled	by	shares	outstanding.	Spread	is	the	bid-ask	spread	using	closing	bid	and	
ask	prices	from	CRSP.		Pvolt	is	a	measure	of	price	volatility,	which	is	the	difference	between	the	
daily	high	price	and	the	daily	low	price	scaled	by	the	daily	high	price.	The	remaining	four	
variables	are	indicator	variables	that	equal	one	if	any	specific	firm	is	meets	the	classification	of	
the	variable,	but	is	equal	to	zero	otherwise.	Firms	are	identified	according	to	their	standard	
industry	codes	(SICs).		DRUG	is	equal	to	one	if	a	firm	is	considered	a	pharmaceutical	company	–	
zero	otherwise;	HEALTHCARE	is	a	broader,	dummy	variable	capturing	health	care	companies;	
INSURER	is	an	indicator	variable	that	represents	health	insurers;	DEVICE	is	an	indicator	variable	
that	equals	one	for	companies	that	produce	medical	products	–	zero	otherwise.	The	average	
stock	price	in	the	sample	was	$34.84,	and	the	median	stock	price	was	$12.70.	The	largest	
category	considered	in	this	analysis	are	health	care	providers,	which	constitute	94.26%	of	the	
sample.	Pharmaceutical	companies	and	medical	device	manufacturers	constitute	a	similar	and	
much	smaller	portion	of	the	sample	at	14.93%	and	12.72%,	respectively.	Health	insurers	form	
the	smallest	component	of	the	analysis	at	3.49%	of	the	firms	in	the	sample.	Note	that	the	four	
indicator	variables	do	not	sum	to	one	given	that	some	of	these	companies	may	belong	to	two	
categories.	
	
Table	1	
Sample	Summary	Statistics-	Healthcare	Firm	Stocks	–	November	9th	2016	
	 Mean	 Median	 Std.	Deviation	 Min	 Max	
	 [1]	 [2]	 [3]	 [4]	 [5]	
	
Price	
MktCap	
Turn	
Spread	
Pvolt	
DRUG	
HEALTHCARE	
INSURER	
DEVICE	
	
	
34.84	
7,704,286.96	
18.6245	
0.0673	
0.0774	
0.1493	
0.9426	
0.0349	
0.1272	
	
12.70	
472,223.77	
11.0858	
0.0100	
0.0686	
0.0000	
1.0000	
0.0000	
0.0000	
	
60.2209	
26,797352.25	
26.1708	
0.4390	
0.0436	
0.3543	
0.2328	
0.1838	
0.3336	
	
0.0515	
2,290.61		
0.04842	
0.0001	
0.0000	
0.0000	
0.0000	
0.0000	
0.0000	
	
651.46	
329,153,361.97	
297.9262	
7.8999	
0.3120	
1.0000	
1.0000	
1.0000	
1.0000	
	
 
 
 
Results 
Cumulative	Abnormal	Returns	–	Entire	Sample	
	 Table	2	summarizes	the	Cumulative	Abnormal	Returns	(CARs)	for	selected	event	
windows,	as	well	as	the	z-statistics	calculated	using	the	Patell	test	(reported	in	parentheses)	
and	the	Jackknife	test	(reported	in	brackets)	used	to	determine	the	statistical	significance	of	the	
results.	The	returns	were	estimated	by	summing	the	residuals	generated	by	simulating	a	market	
model	over	the	event	windows	listed.	The	first	day	of	market	operation	with	the	election	
results,	t,	is	considered	day	0.	The	first	window	described	evaluates	CARs	over	the	course	of	the	
day	before	the	election,	t-1,	to	the	day	after,	t+1,	which	will	here	be	denoted	as	CAR(-1,1).	The	
second	window	evaluates	CARS	for	only	the	day	of	the	election,	t,	to	the	day	after	the	election,	
t+1,	and	will	be	denoted	here	as	CAR(0,1).	The	following	three	event	windows	in	this	analysis	
evaluate	the	periods	5,	10,	and	30	days	following	the	day	of	the	election	(CAR(0,5),	CAR(0,10),	
and	CAR(0,30)	respectively).	
	
Table	2	
Statistical	significance	is	at	the	0.10,	0.05,	and	0.01	levels	is	denoted	with	*,	**,	and	***	respectively.	
Election	Result	Night	–	Entire	Sample	
	 CAR(-1,1)	 CAR(0,1)	 CAR(0,5)	 CAR(0,10)	 CAR(0,30)	
	 [1]	 [2]	 [3]	 [4]	 [5]	
	
Mean	
	
Patell	Z	
Jackknife	Z	
	
0.0357***	
	
(12.049)	
[9.117]	
	
0.0376***	
	
	(14.977)	
[9.398]	
	
	
0.0561***	
	
(14.997)	
[9.218]	
	
	
0.0460***	
	
(9.798)	
[5.819]	
	
-0.0061	
	
(5.365)	
[-0.986]	
	
	 	
	 The	results	in	the	table	imply	statistically	significant	abnormal	returns	over	the	event	
windows	surrounding	the	election.	These	abnormal	returns	continue	in	all	the	event	windows	
included	in	the	analysis	up	to	the	window	10	days	following	the	election,	as	evidenced	by	the	
results	presented	in	columns	[1]-[4]	of	Table	2.	These	results	imply	massive	abnormal	returns	to	
shareholders,	as	well.	The	two-day	event	window	immediately	after	the	election,	CAR(0,1),	
reports	an	abnormal	return	of	3.76%,	which	annualizes	to	a	return	of	about	474%.	Even	
increasing	the	scope	of	the	analysis	to	the	eleven-day	event	window,	CAR(0,10),	reports	
annualized	CARs	in	excess	of	100%.	There	are	no	statistically	significant	CARs	observed	for	the	
30-day	window	in	column	[5].	This	implies	that	although	the	surprise	results	of	the	election	
generated	abnormal	returns	in	the	immediate	aftermath,	the	market	incorporated	the	
information	after	the	short	term.	It	also	may	be	that	it	became	apparent	to	investors	in	the	
weeks	following	the	election	that	quick	and	dramatic	overhauls	of	the	ACA	would	not	likely	be	
politically	feasible.	
		
Cumulative	Abnormal	Return	–	By	Firm	Type	
	 Cumulative	Abnormal	Returns	are	again	reported	in	the	following	table,	this	time	the	
results	are	delineated	by	company	type.		As	with	the	results	presented	in	Table	2,	CARs	for	five	
event	windows	are	obtained	from	estimating	a	daily	market	model	and	summing	the	residual	
returns.		CAR(-1,1)		measures	the	cumulative	abnormal	return	from	day	t-1	to	t+1,	where	day	t	
is	the	event	day,	November	9th,	2016.		Similarly,	CAR(0,1)	is	the	cumulative	abnormal	return	
from	day	t	to	t+1.		CAR(0,3),	CAR(0,5),	and	CAR(0,10)	similarly	cover	increasing	time	windows	
surrounding	the	election.	The	mean	CARs	are	presented	along	with	a	two	corresponding	Z-test	
statistics	generated	using	Patell	tests	(denoted	using	parentheses)	and	Jackknife	tests	(denoted	
using	brackets).		Furthermore,	we	estimate	mean	CARs	for	each	of	the	four	types	of	firms	used	
in	the	sample.		Listed	in	column	[1],	DRUG	identifies	firms	that	are	classified	as	a	
pharmaceutical	company	according	to	standard	industry	codes.		HEALTHCARE	in	column	[2]	
captures	health	care	companies.		INSURER	in	column	[3]	specifies	companies	that	are	
considered	a	health	insurer.		DEVICE	in	column	[4]	identifies	companies	classified	as	Medical	
Products	manufacturers.		
	
	 	
Table	3	
Statistical	significance	is	at	the	0.10,	0.05,	and	0.01	levels	is	denoted	with	*,	**,	and	***	respectively.	
Z-statistics	are	reported	in	parenthesis.	
2016	Election	Results	by	Firm	Type	
	 DRUG		
(N	=	59)	
HEALTHCARE		
(N	=	378)	
INSURER		
(N=14)	
DEVICE	
(N	=	58)	
	 [1]	 [2]	 [3]	 [4]	
	
CAR(-1,1)	
	
	
	
CAR(0,1)	
	
	
	
CAR(0,5)	
	
	
	
CAR(0,10)	
	
	
	
CAR(0,30)	
	
	
0.0729***	
(9.393)	
[7.251]	
	
0.0769***	
(11.788)	
[8.172]	
	
0.0873***	
(7.350)	
[8.247]	
	
0.0808***	
(4.985)	
[6.038]	
	
0.0362*	
(1.293)	
[1.275]	
	
0.0368***	
(11.953)	
[8.969]	
	
0.0271***	
(14.637)	
[9.200]	
	
0.0460***	
(9.396)	
[8.781]	
	
0.0390***	
(4.960)	
[5.349]	
	
0.0072	
(-1.079)	
[-1.222]	
	
0.0277***	
(4.270)	
[2.322]	
	
0.0195***	
(3.915)	
[1.880]	
	
0.0424***	
(4.317)	
[3.011]	
	
0.0650***	
(4.376)	
[3.259]	
	
0.0577***	
(2.363)	
[3.006]	
	
0.0034	
(-0.319)	
[0.575]	
	
0.0160	
(0.904)	
[1.326]	
	
0.0282	
(0.841)	
[1.357]	
	
0.0354	
(0.599)	
[1.147]	
	
0.0050	
(-0.934)	
[-0.773]	
 
	 The	results	in	the	table	suggest	that,	for	the	most	part,	statistically	significant	CARs	are	
observed	through	most	event	windows	in	all	of	the	industries	considered	in	this	analysis,	with	
the	exception	of	companies	operating	in	the	medical	products	and	devices	industry.	
Considering	returns	of	the	two-day	event	window	including	the	day	of	the	election	and	the	day	
following,	CAR(0,1),	pharmaceutical	companies	(column	[1])	exhibit	CARs	with	the	largest	
magnitude	by	a	wide	margin,	with	annualized	CAR	of	approximately	969%.	They	are	followed	by	
the	broadest	subsection	of	the	sample,	health	care	providers	(column	[2]),	with	an	annualized	
CAR	of	341.46%.	Health	insurers	(column	[3])	also	achieved	relatively	high	CARs	of	245.70%.	
Healthcare	providers,	the	subsection	perhaps	most	representative	of	the	industry	as	a	whole,	
loses	statistical	significance	after	the	eleven-day	event	window,	CAR(0,10).	However,	the	
smaller	pharmaceutical	and	insurance	subsections	continue	to	report	statistically	significant	
CARS	event	30	days	following	the	election	results,	with	annualized	returns	of	29.4%	and	
46.90%,	respectively.	Although	pharmaceutical	companies	report	significantly	larger	CARS	
during	the	two-day	event	window,	CAR(0,1),	health	insurers	report	larger	CARS	during	the	31-
day	event	window,	CAR(0,30).
Cross-Sectional	Regressions	
	 Table	4	reports	the	results	from	estimating	the	following	equation	using	cross-sectional	
data	obtained	from	CRSP:	
CAR(0,1)i	=	α	+	γ1DRUGi	+	γ2HEALTHCAREi	+	γ3INSURERi	+	β1Ln(sizei)	+	β2Turni	+	β3Ln(pricei)	+	
β4Spreadi	+	β5Volti	+	εi	
The	dependent	variable	is	the	two-day	cumulative	abnormal	return,	CAR(0,1),	for	each	health	
care	stock	from	the	sample	i	from	day	t	to	t+1,	where	day	t	is	November	9th,	the	first	day	of	
market	operations	with	the	election	results.	The	independent	variables	that	are	the	focus	of	
this	regression	are	the	three	indicator	variables,	which	are	the	dummy	variables	that	identify	
the	industry	the	stocks	belong	in.		As	before,	DRUG	is	an	indicator	variable	equal	to	one	if	the	
stock	belongs	to	a	pharmaceutical	company	according	to	standard	industry	codes.		
HEALTHCARE	is	an	indicator	variable	representing	health	care	providers,	INSURER	is	an	indicator	
variable,	which	identifies	whether	the	company	is	considered	a	health	insurer.	We	omit	the	
indicator	variable	DEVICE	in	order	to	avoid	violating	the	full	rank	condition	required	for	
consistent	estimates.		Five	different	variables	have	been	included	to	serve	as	controls.	Ln(size)	
is	the	natural	log	of	the	firm’s	market	capitalization.	Turn	is	the	share	turnover	for	each	stock,	
which	is	defined	as	the	volume	of	shares	traded	divided	by	shares	outstanding,	while	Ln(price)	
is	the	natural	log	of	the	firm’s	share	price.		Spread	is	the	bid-ask	spread	and	Volt	is	the	price	
volatility,	which	again	is	defined	as	the	share’s	high	price	minus	its	low	price,	scaled	by	its	high	
price.		Statistical	significance	is	indicated	with	asterisks.	Robust	standard	errors	that	account	for	
clustering	across	firms	are	reported	in	parentheses.	
	 
Table	4	
Statistical	significance	is	at	the	0.10,	0.05,	and	0.01	levels	is	denoted	with	*,	**,	and	***	respectively.	
 [1]	 [2] [3]	 [4]	 [5]	 [6]	 [7]	
Intercept 
 
DRUG	
	
HEALTHCARE	
	
INSURER	
	
Ln(size)	
	
Turn	
	
Ln(price)	
	
Spread	
	
Volt	
 
 
Adjusted	R2	
0.00563*	
(0.00952)	
0.05321***	
(0.01422)	
0.01657	
(0.01056)	
0.00451	
(0.02758)	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
0.0184	
0.01203*	
(0.02323)	
0.05267***	
(0.01436)	
0.01634	
(0.01053)	
0.00566	
(0.02794)	
-0.00047	
(0.00150)	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
0.00164	
0.01020	
(0.01010)	
0.05501***	
(0.01465)	
0.01818*	
(0.01049)	
0.00846	
(0.02588)	
	
	
-0.00033	
(0.00026)	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
0.0257	
0.01680	
(0.01197)	
0.04893***	
(0.01460)	
0.01398	
(0.01049)	
0.00908	
(0.02762)	
	
	
	
	
-0.00374*	
(0.00219)	
	
	
	
	
	
0.0217	
0.00786	
(0.00978)	
0.05419***	
(0.01417)	
0.01667	
(0.01070)	
0.00239	
(0.02767)	
	
	
	
	
	
	
-0.29673	
(0.21345)	
	
	
	
0.0192	
-0.02581**	
(0.01208)	
0.04313***	
(0.01339)	
0.00988	
(0.00988)	
0.00067	
(0.02797)	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
0.48696***	
(0.12966)	
	
0.0727	
-0.08355**	
(0.03293)	
0.04629***	
(0.01410)	
0.01027	
(0.01027)	
-0.00380	
(0.02526)	
0.00601**	
(0.00267)	
-0.00072**	
(0.00024)	
-0.00612	
(0.00388)	
-0.65786***	
(0.20504)	
0.62607***	
(0.13621)	
	
0.11143	
	
	
	
	 The	results	of	the	multivariate	regression	generate	mixed	results	in	terms	of	confirming	
the	results	of	the	event	study	technique.	The	indicator	variable	for	DRUG	produces	estimates	
that	are	statistically	significant	from	zero	beyond	the	0.01	level,	and	economically	significant,	
across	the	models	in	all	seven	columns,	confirming	that	the	pharmaceutical	industry	
experienced	positive	CARs	across	the	two-day	event	window.	The	statistically	significant	
annualized	abnormal	return	in	the	model	used	in	column	[7]	is	approximately	583%.		The	
indicator	variable	for	the	broader	healthcare	providing	section,	HEALTHCARE,	produced	p-
values	close	to	statistical	significance	in	many	columns,	but	only	demonstrated	statistical	
significance	in	column	[3].	The	annualized	CAR	associated	with	health	care	providers	in	column	
[3]	is	approximately	229%.	No	statistically	significant	results	were	observed	for	health	insurers	
across	any	of	the	columns.	Examining	the	results	in	column	[7],	in	addition	to	the	statistically	
significant	CARs	in	the	pharmaceutical	industry,	in	the	full	specification	of	the	model,	larger	
firms	and	firms	with	higher	price	volatility	report	statistically	significant	positive	CARs,	and	firms	
with	higher	amounts	of	share	turnover	and	larger	bid-ask	spreads	reported	statistically	
significant	negative	CARs.	
	
Conclusion	
	
	 The	policy	implications	of	health	care	reform	are	important,	because	changes	can	have	
significant	impacts	on	the	firms	that	provide	health	care,	either	directly	or	through	medication	
and	medical	products.	These	impacts	are	evidenced	by	cumulative	abnormal	returns	measured	
in	the	financial	performance	of	firms	operating	in	the	health	care	industry.	The	success	of	the	
Republican	party	in	the	2016	elections,	which	implied	likely	changes	to	health	care	policies	such	
as	the	Affordable	Care	Act,	resulted	in	economically	and	statistically	significant	positive	
abnormal	returns	observed	in	the	pharmaceutical,	health	care,	and	medical	product	industries,	
although	the	statistical	significance	is	particularly	pronounced	and	consistent	in	the	abnormal	
returns	in	the	pharmaceutical	industry,	where	different	methods	of	statistical	testing	found	
returns	in	the	two-day	event	window	surrounding	the	2016	elections	found	abnormal	returns	in	
excess	of	an	annualized	rate	of	500%.	Event	study	techniques	indicate	no	statistically	significant	
abnormal	returns	for	the	entire	sample	when	considering	the	31-day	window	after	the	election,	
however,	implying	that	the	market	incorporated	the	new	information	into	share	prices	within	
the	month.	
	 	
Appendix	
	
Table	5	
Stock	Tickers	by	Category	-	Day	of	Election	Results	–	Listed	Alphabetically	(N	=	402)	
DRUG	(N=59)	 	 	
	
ACRX	
ARQL	
CEMP	
CYAN	
IMGN	
LCI	
NBIX	
OGXI	
RIGL	
TLGT	
	
	
ALBO	
ASMB	
CORT	
DEPO	
INFI	
MEIP	
NBY	
PCRX	
SCLN	
USNA	
	
AMPE	
BCRX	
CPIX	
ECYT	
IPCI	
MSLI	
NEPT	
PCYO	
SCMP	
UTHR	
	
APRI	
BLRX	
CPRX	
ENDP	
IRWD	
MTEX	
NKTR	
PIP	
SGYP	
VRX	
	
ARIA	
BSTC	
CRME	
FLML	
JAZZ	
NAII	
NUTR	
PRPH	
SHPG	
ZGNX	
	
ARLZ	
CCXI	
CTIC	
GRFS	
JNP	
NATR	
NVGN	
PTIE	
SPPI	
HEALTHCARE	(N=378)	 	 	 	 	
	
ABC	
ACAD	
ADK	
AFAM	
ALGN	
AMAG	
AMRN	
APPY	
ARNA	
ATRC	
AZN	
BDX	
BLRX	
BVX	
CBLI	
CGEN	
CLSN	
CPHI	
CRME	
CUTR	
CYTK	
DRRX	
DXTR	
	
ABCO	
ACHC	
ADSK	
AGEN	
ALIM	
AMED	
AMS	
APRI	
ARQL	
ATRI	
BABY	
BEAT	
BMRN	
CAH	
CBM	
CHE	
CLVS	
CPIX	
CRY	
CVM	
DCTH	
DSCI	
EBS	
	
ABIO	
ACHN	
ADUS	
AHPI	
ALKS	
AMGN	
AMSG	
APT	
ARRY	
ATRS	
BASI	
BIIB	
BMY	
CASC	
CBPO	
CI	
CMN	
CPRX	
CSII	
CVSD	
DEPO	
DVA	
ECYT	
	
ABMD	
ACOR	
AEGR	
AIQ	
ALNY	
AMN	
ANGO	
ARAY	
ARWR	
AVEO	
BAX	
BIOL	
BSPM	
CASI	
CCM	
CJJD	
CNMD	
CRIS	
CSU	
CYCC	
DGX	
DVAX	
EDAP	
	
ABT	
ACRX	
AET	
AKRX	
ALR	
AMPE	
ANIK	
ARIA	
ATEC	
AVIR	
BCRX	
BIOS	
BSTC	
CASM	
CELG	
CLBS	
COO	
CRL	
CTIC	
CYH	
DHRM	
DXCM	
ELGX	
	
ABUS	
ACUR	
AEZS	
ALBO	
ALXN	
AMRI	
ANTH	
ARLZ	
ATHX	
AXN	
BDSI	
BKD	
BSX	
CBIO	
CERS	
CLDX	
CORT	
CRMD	
CUR	
CYNO	
DRAD	
DXR	
ELMD	
ELOS	
ETRM	
FLML	
GEN	
GNVC	
HALO	
HOLX	
HWAY	
ICUI	
INFI	
IPCI	
IVC	
KERX	
LHCG	
LUX	
MD	
MEIP	
MNOV	
MTOR	
NBY	
NUS	
NXTM	
OMI	
PBH	
PETS	
PMC	
PRPH	
PTN	
RDNT	
RMD	
RVP	
SGYP	
SNY	
SRPT	
STEM	
TECH	
THO	
UNH	
VASC	
WMGI	
ENDP	
EW	
FMS	
GENE	
GPX	
HCA	
HRC	
HZNP	
IDRA	
INFU	
IPXL	
IVZ	
KND	
LLY	
LXRX	
MDC	
MGCD	
MNTA	
MGYN	
NEOG	
NUVA	
NYMX	
OPK	
PCRX	
PFE	
PMD	
PRSC	
PTX	
RDY	
RMTI	
SCLN	
SHPG	
SPAN	
SSKN	
STJ	
TENX	
TLGT	
UNIS	
VCEL	
XTNT	
ENSG	
EXAC	
FOLD	
GERN	
GRFS	
HEB	
HRT	
IBIO	
IDXX	
INO	
IRIX	
JAZZ	
LAKE	
LMAT	
MASI	
MDCO	
MGLN	
MOH	
MYL	
NEPT	
NVAX	
OCLS	
OPXA	
PCYO	
PGNX	
PODD	
PRTK	
QDEL	
REGN	
RNN	
SCMP	
SKY	
SPEX	
SSY	
SVA	
TEXA	
TRIB	
USPH	
VICL	
	
ENZ	
EXAS	
FONR	
GHDX	
GSK	
HH	
HSIC	
ICAD	
IMGN	
INSM	
IRWD	
JCS	
LCI	
LMNX	
MATN	
MDGL	
MMM	
MRK	
NATR	
NHC	
NVGN	
OFIX	
OREX	
PDCO	
PHMD	
PPHM	
PRXL	
QGEN	
RELV	
ROSG	
SEM	
SNMX	
SPNC	
STAA	
SYK	
TFX	
UAM	
UTHR	
VIVO	
	
ESMC	
EXEL	
FVE	
GILD	
GTXI	
HLF	
HSKA	
ICCC	
IMMU	
INVA	
ISR	
JNJ	
LGND	
LPNT	
MBVX	
MDGN	
MMSI	
MSA	
NAVB	
NKTR	
NVO	
OGXI	
OSIR	
PDEX	
PIP	
PRAN	
PSTI	
QLTI	
RGEN	
RPRX	
SGEN	
SNN	
SPPI	
STAR	
SYN	
THC	
UHS	
UTMD	
VNDA	
	
ESRX	
FBIO	
GALE	
GNMK	
HAE	
HLS	
HUM	
ICLR	
INCY	
IONS	
ISRG	
JNP	
LH	
LUNA	
MCK	
MDT	
MNKD	
MSLI	
NBIX	
NLNK	
NVS	
OMER	
OSUR	
PDLI	
PLX	
PRGO	
PTIE	
RAD	
RIGL	
RTIX	
SGMO	
SNSS	
SRDX	
STE	
TEAR	
THLD	
UHS	
VAR	
WINT	
	
INSURER	(N	=	14)	 	 	 	 	
	
AET	
HUM	
	
AIZ	
MET	
	
ANTM	
MGLN	
	
CI	
MOH	
	
CNC	
PFG	
	
GTS	
UAM	
UNH	 WCG	
DEVICE	(N	=	51)	 	 	 	 	
ABAX	
BIOB	
CSII	
HLS	
LMAT	
NXTM	
PRGO	
STJ	
VASC	
ALR	
BIO	
DXTR	
HRC	
MDT	
OFIX	
QDEL	
SYK	
VIVO	
APPY	
BSX	
ETRM	
ICCC	
MJN	
OMER	
RMD	
TRIB	
ZBH	
APRI	
BVX	
EW	
ICUI	
NEOG	
OMI	
RMTI	
UG	
ZLTQ	
ATRC	
CASM	
EXAC	
INFU	
NURO	
OSUR	
SNN	
UNIS	
BAX	
CERS	
HAE	
JCS	
NUVA	
PODD	
SRDX	
UTMD	
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